Imaginative Apologetics VI - Christian Apologetics and the Human Imagination

Apologetics, Imagination, and Imaginative Apologetics

In earlier posts, I set the framework for the core material in Imaginative Apologetics, seeking to provide the lay of the land in contemporary apologetics and the faculty of imagination.  Now we are engaging the individual articles in Andrew Davison’s edited volume, Imaginative Apologetics: Theology, Philosophy and the Catholic Tradition.[1]  Last post, I gave in-depth consideration of the two articles considering the relationship between faith and reason.  In this post, on to the second of four major sections of the work.  As a reminder, you can find my full treatment in Trinity Journal.[2]

Christian Apologetics and the Human Imagination

Section two of Imaginative Apologetics (“Christian Apologetics and the Human Imagination”) comprises three strong articles noting the importance of imagination and literature in Christian apologetics.

Imaginative Apologetics V - Faith & Reason Reconsidered

Apologetics, Imagination, and Imaginative Apologetics

In my past 4 posts, I have been setting the framework for the core material in Imaginative Apologetics, an excellent compilation of essays edited by Andrew Davison arguing for the centrality of the faculty of imagination in the apologetic enterprise.  I have laid out the historical and contemporary scene of Christian apologetics, and considered Vanhoozer’s and Smith’s contributions to an understanding of imagination.  It is time now for the meat: interaction with the individual articles in Imaginative Apologetics.  This material is derived from my article in Trinity Journal.[1]

Engaging Imaginative Apologetics

Andrew Davison compiles ten articles (plus a robust foreword and introduction) to promote a return to apologetic imagination. The contributors are broadly-catholic British scholars (the one exception is Craig Hovey, from Ashland University, Ohio), although each author admirably avoids sectarianism and denominational polemics. As with all edited collections, the chapters vary in perspective and strength. In this case, the authors also differ in their understanding and exposition of the two key terms of the book’s title: imagination and apologetics.

Davison’s introduction lays out the overarching vision and purpose of the work. The ten individual chapters are broken into four broad sections: (1) Faith and Reason Reconsidered; (2) Christian Apologetics and the Human Imagination; (3) Being Imaginative about Christian Apologetics; and (4) Situating Christian Apologetics.  I will post blog essays engaging with the articles in (respectively) each of the 4 major sections of the anthology, usually offering concise summaries of the content, strengths, and weaknesses of each chapter. A few chapters will receive more in-depth treatment than others, mostly marking areas of my own particular interest and expertise.

Imaginative Apologetics Part IV - Smith, Vanhoozer, and The Place of Apologetic Imagination

Apologetics, Imagination, and Imaginative Apologetics

            This is the 4^th in a series of blog posts covering a review article I wrote for Trinity Journal,[1] a lengthy interaction with Imaginative Apologetics: Theology, Philosophy and the Catholic Tradition, edited by Andrew Davison.^[2]

Previously in this series of posts, I surveyed the terrain of historical and contemporary Christian apologetics, and began a consideration of the place of imagination in apologetics. I want to continue that examination with a focus upon the insights of Kevin Vanhoozer and Jamie Smith. In subsequent posts, I will interact with the various articles in Imaginative Apologetics.

Situating Imagination

In the view of Andrew Davison, editor of and contributor to Imaginative Apologetics, too many current apologetic works are marked by a paucity of imagination. Many apologetic works focus so strongly on rational arguments and proofs that they become “cold or arid.” Thus, the goal of Imaginative Apologetics is to make apologetics “a matter of wonder and desire,” a presentation of a Christian truth “that is supremely attractive and engaging.”^[3] Davison and his contributors find some similarly-concerned company in the contemporary scene of Christian philosophy and apologetics.

Imaginative Apologetics, Part III - The Need for Imagination in Apologetics

Apologetics, Imagination, and Imaginative Apologetics

            A couple years ago, I had opportunity to write a review article for Trinity Journal,[1] a lengthy interaction with Imaginative Apologetics: Theology, Philosophy and the Catholic Tradition, edited by Andrew Davison.^[2] I never took the opportunity to share some of those thoughts here – I now aim to rectify that! 

In my last couple of blog posts, I surveyed the terrain of historical and contemporary Christian apologetics. I want you now to consider the place of imagination in Christian thought and apologetics. In subsequent posts, I will interact with the various articles in Imaginative Apologetics.

Situating Imagination: Imaginative Apologetics & Classical Apologetics

In the view of Andrew Davison, editor of and contributor to Imaginative Apologetics, apologetics is frequently marked by a paucity of imagination. Many apologetic works focus so strongly on rational arguments and proofs that they become “cold or arid.” Thus, the goal of Imaginative Apologetics is to make apologetics “a matter of wonder and desire,” a presentation of a Christian truth “that is supremely attractive and engaging.”^[3]

Imaginative Apologetics, Part II - Situating Apologetics

Apologetics, Imagination, and Imaginative Apologetics

            I’d like to continue sharing some thoughts from a review article I wrote for Trinity Journal,[1] a lengthy interaction with Imaginative Apologetics: Theology, Philosophy and the Catholic Tradition, edited by Andrew Davison.^[2] In my previous blog post, I sought to articulate some of the biblical mandate for apologetics.  In this post, we want to look at just a few historical and contemporary apologetic trends.

In subsequent posts, we’ll look at the place of imagination in Christian scholarship and apologetics, focusing especially on Jamie Smith’s recent contributions. Down the road, I will interact with the various articles in Imaginative Apologetics.

Imaginative Apologetics, Part I - Situating Apologetics: A New Blogging Year!

Apologetics, Imagination, and Imaginative Apologetics

            A couple years ago, I had opportunity to write a review article for Trinity Journal,[1] a lengthy interaction with Imaginative Apologetics: Theology, Philosophy and the Catholic Tradition, edited by Andrew Davison.^[2] I never took the opportunity to share some of those thoughts here – I now aim to rectify that!  I would like to resume somewhat-faithful blogging this year, so this is my first beginning on that road.

In the first couple of blog posts, I will survey the terrain of historical and contemporary Christian apologetics. In subsequent posts, we’ll look at the place of imagination in Christian scholarship and apologetics, focusing especially on Jamie Smith’s recent contributions. Down the road, I will interact with the various articles in Imaginative Apologetics.

Reflections on the Problem of Evil

Every living and breathing human being will come face to face with the question of evil in the world.  Without a doubt, we know that there is something wrong with us, something awry with the world around us.  Our encounters with evil pose a problem for all worldviews, but many feel that evil poses a particularly thorny difficulty for Christianity.

The oldest variation of the problem of evil, known as the logical problem of evil, originates with the Greek philosopher Epicurus:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able?
Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing?
Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?
Then why call him God?

The 18^th-century Scottish skeptic, David Hume, revived Epicurus’ objection against God based on evil in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.  The logical problem of evil argues that God and evil are not logically consistent.  The short form of the propositional argument is simple:

If God exists, then evil does not exist.

Evil exists (i.e., it is false that evil does not exist).

Therefore, God does not exist.